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ABSTRACT 
Since Deng Xiaoping instituted economic reforms under the “reform and open” 
policy in 1978, the Chinese Communist Party has overseen a gradualist approach to 
modernizing China’s economy.  A new Chinese middle class has emerged with China’s 
economic reforms and economic growth.  According to Seymour Martin Lipset’s 
modernization theory, there is a strong relationship between socioeconomic development 
and the emergence of democratic politics.  The growth of an educated middle class, 
according to Lipset, will demand democratization as a means to achieve more 
participation in politics.     
This thesis assesses the validity of Lipset’s argument that socioeconomic 
development is likely to result in a democratic transition through the growth of a liberal 
middle class in the case of contemporary China.  This assessment assesses how closely 
China’s middle class fits Lipset’s model and whether China’s middle class displays 
characteristics that suggest that Lipset’s framework of democratization will hold true in 
China. 
Since spreading democracy around the world was reasserted as a long-range U.S. 
objective in the early 1990s, attention has focused on prospects for democratization in 
China.  This thesis illuminates the political implications of China’s growing middle class 
and argues that China’s economic modernization does not guarantee democratization.  
This is important because the rationale for American politics of engagement with China 
rests in part on the assertion that economic growth over the long run may lead to China’s 
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Since Deng Xiaoping instituted economic reforms under the “reform and open” 
policy in 1978, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has overseen a gradualist approach 
to modernizing China’s economy.  A new Chinese middle class has emerged along with 
China’s economic reforms resulting in economic growth.  According to Seymour Martin 
Lipset’s modernization theory, there is a strong relationship between socioeconomic 
development and the emergence of democratic politics accompanying the growth of an 
educated middle class that will demand democratization as a means to achieve more 
participation in politics.1  This thesis assesses the validity of Lipset’s argument that as it 
applies to the case of contemporary China.  How closely does the Chinese middle class fit 
Lipset’s model?  Does the Chinese middle class display characteristics that suggest that 
Lipset’s framework of democratization will hold true in China? 
B. CONCEPTUAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Since spreading democracy around the world became a long-range U.S. objective 
in the early 1990s, attention has focused on prospects for democratization in China.2  
This thesis assesses the political implications of China’s growing middle class and argues 
that China’s economic modernization may not lead to democratization.  This is important 
because the rationale for American politics of engagement with China rests in part on the 
assertion that economic growth over the long run may lead to China’s democratization.  
However, most observers in the West misinterpreted the origins of the Tiananmen Square 
protest in 1989 simply as a democracy movement, rather than as initially intended to 
address widely perceived bureaucratic corruption and rapidly rising inflation.   Protests 
subsided in the aftermath of Tiananmen, and many Chinese did not react to the CCP’s 
decision to restore economic stability by entrenching its control of the economy to 
control inflation. 
                                                 
1 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday & 
Company, 1960), 52. 
2 William J. Clinton, National Security Strategy of the United States, 1994-1995: Engagement and 
Enlargement (Washington: Brassey’s, 1995), 1. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Approaches to Democratization 
There are three major approaches to understanding the role of the middle class in 
democratization.  These are Lipset’s modernization theory, Samuel Huntington’s study of 
democratization from 1974 to 1990, and Barrington Moore’s structuralist theory.  
Lipset’s variable-oriented approach rests on the overall assertion that socioeconomic 
development has led to the expansion of a liberal middle class in past democracies.3  
Moore’s case-oriented approach establishes conditions that led up to past bourgeois 
revolutions, and helps to explain the role of the middle class: the intervening variable.4  
Huntington’s work shows the result of modernization on democratization, particularly in 
Asia, following Lipset’s work that focuses on Europe and Latin America.5  Rather than 
posing these theories against one another, these approaches may work together to pose 
the question concerning the role of China’s middle class in a prospective democratic 
transition. 
Lipset’s modernization theory derives a correlation between socioeconomic 
development, the rise of a liberal middle class, and democratic government.  Based on 
studies of democratic and non-democratic states in Europe and Latin America, Lipset 
established requisites for democratization via modernization.6  Lipset states that the 
strongest democratic states have strong economies, efficient agriculture, advance 
industrialization, and a large middle class with increased purchasing power.  Weaker 
democracies and authoritarian states have weaker economies, labor intensive agriculture, 
limited industrialization, and a small middle class with less purchasing power.  The 
theory, however, is a correlation of requisite conditions and does not suggest a direct 
casual relationship.7   
                                                 
3 Lipset, Political Man, 52. 
4 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 428-429. 
5 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of 
Oklahoma: Norman, 1992), 59. 
6 Lipset, Political Man, 52. 
7 David Potter, Democratization (Cambridge: Polity Press. 1997), 521. 
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Where Lipset leaves off, Barrington Moore’s structuralist framework helps to 
identify critical features of the Chinese middle class and its democratic behavior.  
Structural theory emphasizes changing structures of power favorable to democratization.  
Moore’s structural theory isolates three roads to modernity involving agrarian societies 
modernizing into industrial ones.8  The first road is bourgeois revolution as in the United 
Kingdom, the United States and France.  The second is a revolution from above as in the 
cases of Prussia, Germany and Japan.  The final type of transition is peasant revolution 
followed in China and Russia. 
Moore’s predominant factors--the economic situation of the aristocracy, the 
relative strength and organization of the bourgeoisie, and fate of the peasant class--are 
used to analyze five conditions needed for democratic development.9  The first condition 
is "the development of a balance to avoid too strong a crown or too independent a landed 
aristocracy." The second is "a turn toward an appropriate form of commercial agriculture, 
either on the part of the landed aristocracy or the peasantry."  The third and forth are "the 
weakening of the landed aristocracy and the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois 
coalition against the peasants and workers."  The final condition is "a revolutionary break 
with the past."  These factors help identify the middle classes’ alliance either toward 
elites or with workers. 
Moore is not the only structuralist theorist.  Dietrich Rueschemeyer identifies five 
social classes in South American societies and their different orientations toward 
democratization in relation to the “changing dynamics of class power.”10  The push for 
democratization from large landlords, peasantry, urban working class, bourgeoisie, and 
salaried and professional classes depends on the structure and degree of state power, 
rather than the level of the country’s socioeconomic development.  Rueshemeyer’s five 
classes are useful to help break down and categorize China’s changing socioeconomic 
structure and to assess the effects of the suppression of protest in China. 
The third approach is Huntington’s study of the “third wave” of democratization.  
Huntington provides three explanations in The Third Wave on how economic                                                  
8 Moore, 428. 
9 Ibid., 428-429. 
10 Potter, 20. 
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development provides the basis for democratization from 1974 to 1990.11  First, rising oil 
prices world wide weakens states that had adopted Marxist/Leninist economic policies.  
Second, sufficient economic development is reached in other states that facilitate 
democratization.  Finally, rapid economic development destabilizes authoritarian 
regimes, and compels the ruling elites to either liberalize or repress reformers.  
Huntington identifies the predominant economic conditions that effect regime change in 
the late twentieth century where Asian states experience economic growth and an 
expansion of the middle class. 
In contrast to the proponents of the role of a middle class in leading 
democratization, a number of theorists suggest that a growing middle class instead 
strengthens the current government and the status quo.  Guillermo O’Donnell labels this 
effect as ”bureaucratic-authoritarianism,” based on his studies of modernization in South 
America that show that ”more open political systems” do not necessarily result.12  Adam 
Przeworski has also studied Lipset’s modernization theory and points out that “rapid 
growth is not destabilizing for democracies (or for dictatorships).”13  Likewise, Francis 
Fukuyama suggests that “industrialization and wealth certainly are helpful in maintaining 
democracy.”14  The opposition to modernization theory particular addresses states in the 
early phases of industrialization and modernization, such as China.  A newly formed 
middle class is more likely to form alliances with elites rather then oppose elites.     
2. Perspectives on Classes and Democratic Behaviors 
There are three distinct perspectives on the implications of rise of a Chinese 
middle class.  The first argues that an improving socioeconomic environment in China is 
successfully making a conservative Chinese middle class more liberal and fostering 
emerging democratic beliefs.  The second acknowledges broadly democratic ideas among 
Chinese, but it does not see a significant rising liberal middle class pushing for more 
                                                 
11 Huntington., 59. 
12 Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Univ. of 
California, 1973), vii. 
13 Adam Przeworski, “What Makes Democracies Endure?” Journal of Democracy, 7, no. 1 (Jan 1996): 
42. 
14 Francis Fukuyama, “The Illusion of Exceptionalism.” Journal of Democracy, 8, no. 3 (July 1997); 
146. 
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liberalization, at least not yet.   A third perspective acknowledges the rise and 
liberalization of China’s middle class, but sees little prospect of a consequent liberal push 
to democratize China.  
The first perspective is represented by David Zweig whose survey portrays 
Chinese in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong preferring democracy.15  The survey, 
however, only addresses the rural Chinese population, and not the emerging class of 
business elites and middle class. This democratic potential encourages Bruce Gilley to 
conclude that China is on the brink of democratization because of the impact of 
globalization on China and because of the accumulating effect of the gradual economic 
and social reforms in China that followed Tiananmen Square in 1989.  Bruce Gilley’s 
China’s Democratic Future suggests that prospects for democratization have grown since 
the start of Deng’s reforms in 1978, that Tiananmen was a ”near death” experience that 
could have resulted in elites siding with reformers, and that China’s de-politicizing of the 
PLA and economic growth have made democratization increasingly likely should an 
economic crisis trigger a political crisis.16 
The second perspective, including Przeworski and Pei, acknowledges universal 
democratic sentiments among Chinese, but does not see a significant rising liberal middle 
class pushing for more liberalization, at least not yet.17  Commenting on the 1989 
Tiananmen Square crisis, Lipset himself states that “although the demand for democracy 
has been a major force throughout the twentieth century, even those demanding 
democracy have generally placed greater stress on unity between state and society, strong 
and effective rule, and anti-bureaucratism than on such requisites for democratic rule as 
institutionalization, procedure, law, division or power, and the willingness to  
 
 
                                                 
15 David Zweig, Democratic Values, Political Structures, and Alternative Politics in Greater China 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2002), 39. 
16 Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future (New York: Columbia, 2004), 243. 
17 Minxin Pei.  China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 207. 
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compromise.”18  This is revealing since the first camp bases much of its argument on 
Lipset’s work in supporting its claims that increasing liberalization is associated with 
socioeconomic growth. 
The third perspective does not associate the rise of a middle class with a liberal 
push to democratize, and argues instead that the political outlook of a rising middle class 
will likely support and sustain the current regime.  In addition to the theories of 
O’Donnell, Przeworski and Fukuyama, three recent views of the political outlooks of 
China’s changing classes are reflected in Elizabeth Perry’s Chinese Society, in Bruce 
Dickson’s Red Capitalists in China and in Margaret Pearson’s China's New Business 
Elite.  Dickson and Pearson both address the rise of a new business elite and business 
owners.19  They suggest that both U.S. and CCP leaders see this as an indication that 
China is on its way to democratization, but the U.S. observers are hopeful and the CCP 
leaders are fearful.  But the reality, according to them, is that this new elite is not pushing 
for political and social reform, but rather is concerned to safeguard its profit.  Perry’s 
Chinese Society offers another view, particularly of the farmers and workers, and asserts 
that they are exploited and not getting rich.20  Dickson and Pearson address Lipset's 
modernization theory explicitly, and they argue, to the contrary, that China's economic 
development is not leading it any closer to democratization any time soon.  
David Martin Jones depicts the middle classes in Asia generally and in “Greater 
China” in particular as conservative and identifies a culture of dependency between the 
educated middle class and the regimes that govern them.21  While Jones does not 




                                                 
18 Seymour Martin Lipset, Democracy in Asia and Africa (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Inc, 1998), 65. 
19 Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), 169: Margret 
Pearson, Margaret M., China’s New Business Elite (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1997), 4. 
20 Elizabeth Perry, Chinese Society, 2nd Ed. (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 7. 
21 David Martin Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in Pacific 
Asia,” Comparative Politics 30, no. 2 (Jan 1998): 147.  
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class’s dependency and support of the CCP.  Unger goes further and says that “the rise of 
China’s middle class blocks the way (to democratization),” leaving no room for 
interpretation.22   
3. Taiwan as a Case Study 
The case study of Taiwan shows how economic development led to one of 
Huntington’s economic triggers that compelled the middle class to mobilize and 
sufficiently shift its support away from the state to force ruling elites to work with 
reformers.  Although structurally different, the Taiwanese and Chinese middle classes 
share similar attitudes and behaviors that can be applied in this thesis.  Taiwan’s case will 
show why the Taiwanese kept the KMT in power more than a decade after the lifting of 
martial law in 1987.  The implication from the Taiwan case is that even if the ruling CCP 
leaders were to follow the KMT’s example, they could remain in power after 
democratization.  The Chinese, like all citizens, demand services over liberties.  
Democratizing China would be more challenging than the CCP introducing reforms to 
liberalize only certain aspects of the state, society and economy.  Steve Tsang’s 
Democratization in Taiwan compares Taiwan and China to assess the implications for 
democratization in China.  Laurence Whitehead suggest that democratization along the 
same lines as Taiwan would be difficult, but liberalization into something short of full 
democracy beyond gradualist reform by the CCP could be possible.23 
Examining Taiwan does address questions about Chinese behavior and why the 
KMT remained in power years after liberalization and democratization.  Linda Chao and 
Ramon Myers suggest the KMT maintained the popular support of the Taiwanese 
because the KMT established institutions to educate and employ middle class officials 
and because Taiwanese desired political and economic stability over the more dramatic 
political and social changes proposed by the opposition. 24 
                                                 
22 Jonathan Unger, “China’s Conservative Middle Class,” Far Eastern Economic Review 169, no. 3, 
(Apr 2006): 31. 
23 Laurence Whitehead, “The Democratization of Taiwan: A Comparative Perspective,” Steve Tsang 
and Hung-mao Tien, Democratization in Taiwan (Oxford: St Antony’s College, 1999), 168. 
24 Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, “The First Chinese Democracy,” Asian Survey 34, no. 3 (1994): 
215. 
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4. Opinions on U.S. Implications 
The end of the Cold War revealed a number of new U.S. security concerns.  The 
most important concern was China’s commitment to nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons.  What has followed since is a pattern of U.S. policies intended to use economic 
incentives make China a responsible “stake holder” in the international community.  This 
is based on the theory of Democratic Peace, where democracies are less likely to wage 
war against other democracies, and assumes a democratic China will be easier to 
cooperate with rather than an isolated, authoritarian China.  
Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in 
Singapore, has observed that “the United States should be among the first to celebrate 
China’s progress” but the “United States is doing more to destabilize China than any 
other power” with no foreseeable change in policy.25  Mahbubani’s observation is quite 
accurate and identifies a troublesome policy dating back to Presidents George H. W. 
Bush and Bill Clinton.  Despite continued human rights violation, a growing trade deficit, 
and Beijing’s reluctance to improve its human rights record, President Bush sustained 
relations with the PRC following the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989.  President 
Clinton declared in his 1994 National Security Strategy that the primary US goals were to 
“enlarge democracy” in the world—a notion based on democratic peace theory.26   
Clinton reflected years later about his decision in his autobiography. 
The United States had a big stake in bringing China into the global 
community.  Greater trade and involvement would bring more prosperity 
to Chinese citizens; more contacts with the outside world; more 
cooperation on problems like North Korea. Where we needed it; greater 
adherence to the rules of international law; and we hoped, the advance of 
personal freedom and human rights.27 
Clinton’s policy was intended to bring the PRC into the international community 
according to prevailing Western norms, using China’s own rapid economic expansion to 
crush the Chinese Communist Party authoritarian hold on its people.  Much of this was 
                                                 
25 Kishore Mahbubani, “Understanding China,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October, 2005): 
49. 
26 Clinton, National Security Strategy of the United States, 1. 
27 William J Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 598. 
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based on democratic peace theory.  Bruce Russett’s modification of democratic peace 
theory attempts to resolve how this approach applies to non-democratic states.28  
According to Russert, the PRC has not changed much, nor does it show any prospect in 
the near future.  But, he notes, “China’s economic liberalization and marketization have 
caused the intensification of class conflicts that is creating a dilemma for the communist 
regime.”29  In addition to the internal issues, the PRC has no strategy to settle its dispute 
with a democratic Taiwan threatening to declare its independence, which heavily offends 
Chinese nationalism on the mainland.30 
5. Overall Literature Assessment 
Overall, the existing literature helps to evaluate the degree of democratic behavior 
and attitudes of China’s middle class.  China’s middle class is expanding to 15 percent of 
the population and half of the urban work force.31  Closed access to survey research in 
China makes an accurate picture difficult.  In addition, the inadequacy of any single 
explanatory framework derived from European and South American democratic 
transitions requires a combination of theories to assess the likelihood of an Asian 
democratic transition.  Even Taiwan’s democratization, as pointed out by Whitehead, is 
insufficient to map out which route democracy may take in the mainland.32   
Despite this, U.S. policy makers are basing their policies on the promise that 
democracy is strongly associated with modernization.  Based on the literature, Lipset's 
theory is neither right nor is it wrong, because the middle class is either too small or 
dependent on the very state the theory proposes for the middle class to change.  This is 
supported by the behavior of “greater China’s” middle classes following the 1989 
Tiananmen Square crisis and Taiwan's democratic transition and by the fact that the KMT 
remained a decade in power following the end of martial law in 1987. 
                                                 
28 Bruce Russett, Triangulating Peace (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 14. 
29 An Chen, “Rising-Class Politics and its impact on China’s Path to Democracy,” Democratization 
22, no. 2, (2003): 156. 
30 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2nd ed (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co, 2004), 329. 
31 The Economist, “To get rich is glorious,” The Economist 362, no 8256 (Jan, 2002): 19-25.  
32 Whitehead, 168. 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis describes and analyzes the behavior of the Chinese middle class from 
1989 to 2005 that can be applied to Lipset’s modernization theory.  This thesis tests the 
validity of Lipset’s argument that socioeconomic development produces a liberal middle 
class that will push for democratization by using Moore’s work to determine if the 
Chinese middle class is liberal enough to fit in the modernization theory framework.  The 
emergence of a middle class from a state’s socioeconomic development, as described in 
Lipset’s modernization theory, is the independent variable.  The transition to democracy, 
as stated in Huntington’s The Third Wave, is the dependent variable.  The intervening 
variable is the alliance to workers, as described by Moore, formed by the middle class 
altering its attitude from conservative to liberal in nature.  This middle class demands 
more participation in the government which forces political liberalization and 
democratization.  Even assuming China meets Lipset’s socioeconomic requisites, the 
middle class must meet Lipset’s liberal requisites in order to be a sufficient push for 
democratization. 
Because Lipset’s framework alone cannot alone determine the liberal potential of 
Chinese society using both variable analysis in Moore’s structuralist framework and 
Lipset’s comparative approach in modernization theory, is used.  Moore’s structuralist 
approach will help characterize the Chinese attitudes and behavior in order to determine 
whether the Chinese middle class is liberal enough to meet Lipset’s requisites. 
E. SOURCES 
Primary sources include surveys that can give a picture of Chinese preferences 
regarding democracy over authoritarian rule.  Primary sources and secondary sources 
indicate that the Chinese prefer freedom of choice.  China remains undemocratic and 
shows no signs of democratizing from an effort led from either from below or above.  
Therefore, there is a difference between what China’s middle class says it prefers and 
does prefer.  This thesis is not to show that they are lying, but instead to show that their 
actions and behavior are illiberal, particularly compared to what they say concerning 
democratic beliefs.   
11 
Surveys on China’s changing job market, per capita income, and auto sales can 
help determine growth, income, and materialistic attitudes of the middle class’s lower to 
upper ranks.  This will help to establish that the growth of China’s middle class.  In 
addition, it assesses whether Lipset’s theory can be tested in China.  It also establishes 
and tracks the growing size of China’s middle class. 
Secondary sources include the existing scholarly research on the rise and actions 
of the middle class.  With no shortage of secondary sources on the growing Chinese 
middle class, Chinese behavior may be extrapolated to determine why the important 
intervening variable is silent or dormant.  A number of explanations can be offered by 
secondary sources, including dependency, bureaucratic-authoritarianism, and rent-
seeking.   
F. THESIS SYNOPSIS 
Determining whether the Chinese middle class’s outlook is liberal enough for 
Lipset’s requisites for democratization resolves the important intervening variable that 
allows Lipset’s modernization theory to fulfill its correlation between socioeconomic 
growth and democratization.  If this correlation is established, the independent variable 
required by democratic peace theory is established, and the U.S. China policy is soundly 
based. 
The existing evidence shows that Chinese behavior does not suggest that the 
growth of China’s middle class will lead democratization.  In fact, the evidence shows 
that socioeconomic growth helps sustain the current form of government, whether that 
government is a democratic or not, and will create a new business elite that will block 
further reform. 
Applying historic and current behavioral evidence to Moore’s framework will 
establish the potential of the Chinese middle class to shift its allegiance to workers and 
away from supporting elites.  Huntington’s study of late twentieth century 
democratization indicates that economic growth is not permanent, and a downturn could 
upset the requisite rate of economic growth that Lipset associates with economies in the 
modernization theory.   
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An analysis of Taiwan’s initial democratic transition in 1986, spurred by a 
stagnant economy, will offer a comparative basis to assess how much a PRC middle 
class, nurtured by a Leninist regime, may push for economic and political reform.  This 
study focuses on the dependence of modern Chinese middle classes on the state that 
established the social, political and economic environment for the middle class.  
Specifically, the Taiwan case, in which the KMT maintained its popular support 13 years 
after the lifting of martial law in 1987, suggests that the conservative middle class was 
reluctant to pursue rampant reform that could sacrifice social and economic stability.  
This case distinguishes the difference between what the Chinese middle class says and 
what it may do when it comes to the choice of democratizing or not. 
This thesis assesses the validity of Lipset’s argument that socioeconomic 
development produces a liberal middle class that will push for democratization by using 
Moore’s work to determine if the Chinese middle class is liberal enough to fit in the 
modernization theory framework.  This thesis will not look at democratic transition and 
consolidation, nor will it compare Taiwan’s transition to what could happen in China.  
Although Whitehead argues the institutional system in Taiwan and China sufficiently 
differ from one another and inhibit direct comparison or application of the Taiwanese 
roadmap to democratization to China, the developmental history of Taiwan and 
developmental trends in China indicate that China’s economic and social development 
will follow Taiwan’s and the potential for democratization will increase.33 
                                                 
33 Whitehead, 168. 
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II. REQUISTES FOR DEMOCRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The improving socioeconomic development in China begs observers to ask the 
question whether or not modernization will prompt political liberalization by the CCP 
enough to facilitate democratization.  First, this chapter clarifies Lipset’s linkage between 
socioeconomic development and democracy and applies it to the PRC and Taiwan.  
Second, this section addresses supporting and opposing developmental arguments.  Third, 
this section quantifies the growth of the middle class in the PRC since 1978.  Finally, this 
section ascertains whether Lipset’s framework explains the political liberalization and 
democratization that occurred in Taiwan in the 1980s and the political liberalization that 
is occurring in the PRC.   
B. LIPSET’S MODEL 
 Lipset’s model for modernization applies several categories of requisite 
indicators: industrialization, urbanization, education, and wealth.34  These indicators were 
found in democratic European and Latin-American states during the 1960s.  This section 
looks at China’s current status in terms of these requisites.  First, this section reviews 
Lipset’s data on state already democratic or authoritarian at the time of Political Man.  
Second, updated figures taken between 2000 and 2006 are provided.  Finally, data from 
China and Taiwan are compared to the pervious sets of data.  This process helps to assess 
how well China fits in Lipset’s requisites for democracy.  
1. Industrialization 
Lipset defined industrialization in regard to socioeconomic development, 
modernization and democratization by the average percent of males employed in 
agriculture.35  Based on this data and the type of regimes in European and Latin 
American states, Lipset characterized European states as either “more democratic or less 
                                                 
34 Lipset. Political Man, 52. 
35 Ibid., 52. 
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democratic,” and Latin American states as either “more dictatorial or less dictatorial.”36  
By 1960, “more democratic” states in Europe employed 21 percent of their males in 
agriculture, while the “less democratic” states in Europe employed 41 percent.  “Less 
dictatorial” states in Latin America employed 52 percent of their males in agriculture 
while “more dictatorial” states in Latin America employed 67 percent. 
Spain, Western Europe’s last state to democratize, employed only 5.3 percent of 
its population in agriculture in 2004.37  In Latin America and South American, Honduras 
and Columbia employ the highest percentage of their populations in agriculture:   
Honduras employed 34 percent in 2001 and Columbia employed 22.7 percent in 2000.38  
The PRC employed 49 percent of its population in agriculture in 2005.39   Therefore, in 
terms of industrialization, the PRC is less industrialized, “less dictatorial” than Latin 
America, and “less democratic” than Europe by Lipset’s requisites in 1960s.  In 2005, the 
PRC is more industrialized and “more dictatorial” then Latin America and “less 
democratic” then Europe. 
Taiwan employed only 6 percent of its population in agriculture in 2005.40 
Taiwan’s economy averaged in 6.6 percent in agriculture from 1980 to 1987.41  
Therefore, Taiwan is less dictatorial then Latin America/more democratic than Europe by 
Lipset’s requisites in 1960s.  By today’s numbers, Taiwan is less dictatorial than Latin 
America and less democratic than Europe. 
 
                                                 
36 Lipset, Political Man, 52. 
37 Central Intelligence Agency. “Spain,” (The World Factbook, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sp.html#Econ. (accessed Nov 2, 2006). 
38 Central Intelligence Agency. “Honduras,” (The World Factbook, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ho.html#Econ. (accessed Nov 2, 2006). Central 
Intelligence Agency. “Columbia,” (The World Factbook, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/co.html#Econ. (accessed Nov 2, 2006). 
39 Central Intelligence Agency. “China,” (The World Factbook, 
2007),https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ. (accessed Nov 2, 2006). 
40 Central Intelligence Agency. “Taiwan,” (The World Factbook, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html#Econ (accessed Nov 14, 2006). 
41 Christopher Howe, “The Taiwan Economy: The Transition to Maturity and the Political Economy 
of its Changing International Status,” The China Quarterly, No. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary 
Taiwan.(Dec., 1996): 1173. 
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2. Urbanization 
The second requisite Lipset identifies is urbanization.42  In stable European and 
English-speaking democracies, 38 percent of the population resides in metropolitan areas.  
Of this 38 percent, 43 percent resided in cities over 20,000 people, and 28 percent resided 
in cities over 100,000 people.  Unstable European and English-speaking democracies and 
dictatorships had 23 percent of their population in metropolitan areas.  Of this 23 percent, 
24 percent resided in cities over 20,000 people, and 16 percent resided in cities over 
100,000 people.  Unstable Latin-American democracies and dictatorships had 26 percent 
of their population in metropolitan areas.  Of this 26 percent, 28 percent resided in cities 
over 20,000 people and 22 percent in cities over 100,000 people.  Stable Latin-American 
dictatorships had 15 percent of their population in metropolitan areas.  Of this 15 percent, 
17 percent resided in cities over 20,000 people, and 12 percent resided in cities over 
100,000 people. 
The measurement of China’s urbanization varies.  Minxin Pei cites one United 
Nations report that estimates that 50 percent of China’s population was urbanized in 1998 
while another report estimated the 39 percent in 2002.43  Despite the discrepancy, 
China’s population is certainly urbanizing rapidly.  Barry Naughton has also tracked the 
change in China’s urbanization since 1978.44  First, China’s cities are physically 
expanding into the countryside.  An estimated 10 percent of China’s population resided in 
urban areas without an urban residence passes in 1978.  This number is expected to 
increase to 60 percent by 2020.  Finally, the number of small towns has increased from 
2,660 to 20,374 from 1982 to 2001.   
Assuming over 51 percent of China’s population resides in urban areas does not 
mean China has urbanized sufficiently as democratic European and Latin American 
States.  The high number of Chinese employed in agriculture and unemployment rate 
between 9 and 20 percent suggests that the large numbers of Chinese in urban areas are 
not completely urbanized in the same manner Lipset described in Political Man. 
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44 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transition and Growth (Cambridge: MIT, 2007), 128. 
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3. Education 
Lipset’s third requisite is education, primarily measured in terms of literacy 
rates.45  Stable European and English-speaking democracies had an approximate 96 
percent literacy rate.  Unstable European and English-speaking democracies and 
dictatorships had an average 85 percent literacy rate.  Unstable Latin-American 
democracies and dictatorships had an average 74 percent literacy rate.  Stable Latin-
American dictatorships had an average 46 percent literacy rate.  From this observation, 
Lipset states that democratic states have higher literacy rates then non-democratic states. 
China’s literacy rate was reported as 90.9 percent in 2002.46  Taiwan’s literacy 
rate was reported as 96.1 percent in 2003.47  Europe’s lowest literacy rate is reported by 
Greece as 97 percent.48  Latin America’s literacy rate ranges between 76 percent, 
reported in Honduras, the lowest, and 97 percent in Argentina, the highest.49 
Despite whatever high education credit China is given or gives itself, its high 
literacy rate in terms of modernization is meaningless.  The quality of education and 
utilization of education is highly questionable since China’s industrialization places it 
“more dictatorial” then Latin America and “less democratic” then Europe, and China’s 
population remains either employed in agriculture and unemployed then urbanized.   
4. Wealth 
Finally, Lipset looks at a state’s economic growth and the social impact on the 
working and middle classes. Stable European and English-speaking democracies had an 
average per capita income of $695.  Unstable European and English-speaking                                                  
45 Lipset, Political Man, 53. 
46 Central Intelligence Agency. “China,” (The World Factbook, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html#People. (accessed Nov 2, 2006). 
47 Central Intelligence Agency. “Taiwan,” (The World Factbook, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html#People. (accessed Nov 2, 2006). 
48 Central Intelligence Agency. “Greece,” (The World Factbook, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gr.html#People. (accessed Mar 16, 2006).  Greece 
reported a 97 percent literacy rate among the countries categorized as the Europe Union in the CIA’s World 
Factbook. 
49 Central Intelligence Agency. “Honduras,” (The World Factbook, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ho.html#Econ. (accessed Mar 16, 2007).  
Central Intelligence Agency. “Argentina,” (The World Factbook, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ar.html#People (accessed Mar 16, 2007) 
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democracies and dictatorships had an average GDP of $308.  Unstable Latin-American 
democracies and dictatorships had an average GDP of $171.  Stable Latin-American 
dictatorships had an average GDP of $119. 
Another indication of wealth is the purchasing power of individuals and the 
accessibility of utilities and media.50  Stable European and English-speaking democracies 
had 205 telephones, 350 radios and 341 newspapers per 1,000 persons.  Unstable 
European and English-speaking democracies and dictatorships had 58 telephones, 160 
radios and 176 newspapers per 1,000 persons.  Unstable Latin-American democracies 
and dictatorships had had 25 telephones, 85 radios and 102 newspapers per 1,000 
persons.  Stable Latin-American dictatorships had had 10 telephones, 43 radios and 43 
newspapers per 1,000 persons.   
Of the estimated 1,313,973,713 people in China in 2006, 123 million, or 9 percent 
of the population, use the internet. 351 million, or 26 percent of the population, use 
telephones.  438 million, or 33 percent of the population, use mobile cellular phones.51   
In 2005, China has the largest population of mobile phone users, and the third largest 
population of internet users.52 
Of Taiwan’s 23,036,087 people, 13.5 million, or 58 percent of Taiwan, use 
telephones.53  22.2 million, 96 percent, use cellular phones.  13.21 million, 57 percent, 
use the internet.  This makes Taiwan the world’s 22nd largest population of mobile phone 
users in 2006, and the 20th largest population of internet users in 2005.54  By 
comparison, of Europe’s 486,642,177 people, 238 million, 48 percent of Europeans in 
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2005, used telephones.55  466 million Europeans, 95 percent in 2005, used mobile 
cellular phones.  247 million, 50 percent in 2006, used the internet. 
C. SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING ARGUMENTS 
Lipset’s study of the correlation between economic growth and democracies is not 
perfect.  Over the years, supporting and opposing arguments have emerged and clarify 
the socio-economic dynamics of the end of the twentieth century.  First, Huntington’s 
study of the “third wave of democratization” examines the period since Lipset’s study, 
and it includes Asia.  Second, Adam Prezworski has established that the correlation 
between sustained economic growth and sustained democracy also applies to economic 
growth-sustaining non-democratic states.  Finally, Minxin Pei examined the  
impact of sustained, rapid economic growth on a lagging social and political system in 
China.  Huntington, Prezworksi and Pei make a study of the validity of modernization 
theory in modern day China feasible. 
1. Huntington’s Argument: Supporting 
As important as Lipset’s work is to the study of modernization and 
democratization, his Political Man studied Latin-America and Western Europe in the 
1950s.  Huntington and Pei provide a more up to date study of the economic development 
that occurred in Asia in the second half of the twentieth-century.  Huntington’s The Third 
Wave helps to explain the democratization in Taiwan in the 1980s.  
According to Huntington, “an overall correlation exists between the level of 
economic development and democracy, yet no level or pattern of economic development 
is in itself either necessary or sufficient to bring about democratization.”56  Huntington 
provides three explanations of how economic development provided the basis for 
democracy from 1974 to 1990.57  First, the rising oil prices worldwide weakened states 
that had adopted Marxist/Leninist economic policies.  Second, sufficient economic 
development was reached in other states that facilitated democratization, particularly by 
                                                 
55 Central Intelligence Agency. “European Union,” (The World Fact Book, 2007), 
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56 Huntington, 59. 
57 Ibid., 59. 
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spreading values associated as democratic through education and creating new sources of 
power outside of the government.58  Finally, rapid economic development destabilized 
authoritarian regimes, and states were compelled to liberalize or repress reformers. 
Huntington identified a specific range of per capita GNP correlating with the 
democratization of states from 1974 to 1990.59  Prior to the “third wave,” only one 
democratic country had a per capita GNP less than $250.  Three countries had per capita 
GNPs between $250 and $1,000, and five countries had per capita GNPs between $1,000 
and $3,000.  Finally, 18 countries had per capita GNPs greater than $3,000.  During the 
third wave of democratizations, between 1974 and 1989, the number of democratized or 
liberalized states had doubled.60  Two countries democratized or liberalized in this period 
and had per capita GNPs less than $250.  11 countries had per capita GNPs between $250 
and $1,000.  16 countries had per capita GNPs between $1,000 and $3,000.  Finally, two 
democratized/liberalized countries had per capita GNPs greater than $3,000. 
Despite the rapid economic growth in China since 1978, China’s per capita GDP 
today falls below Lipset’s and Huntington’s requisites in terms of GDP.  Today, China’s 
per capita GDP is report to be $7,600 as of 2006, ranked 109 of 229 countries.61  
Taiwan’s per capita GDP is 29th in the world, at $29,000.  The European Union is 34th 
with $29,400.  The European per capita GDP ranges from Luxembourg’s second place 
ranking of $68,800, and Russia’s 81st ranked $12,100. 
China’s economic growth, expansion of the middle class and spending power and 
the initial development of an economic base for democratization does explain why 
Taiwan democratized during the “third wave” and China did not.  According to 
Huntington, “a chain or funnel (choose your metaphor) of causation exits; and 
international, social, economic, cultural, and, most immediately, political factors all 
operate, often in conflicting ways, either to facilitate the creation of democracy or to 
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20 
sustain authoritarianism.”62  Therefore, while Huntington explains how and why states 
democratized during the “third wave,” the same dynamics found from 1974 to 1989 are 
not guaranteed to explain China’s prospect for democratization. 
2. Przeworski’s Argument: Opposing 
Not every state liberalized sufficiently to facilitate democratization from 1974 to 
1989.  Lacking any of Huntington’s three economic factors initiating democratization, the 
PRC remained unchanged in the “third wave” era.  First, oil price hikes did not cripple 
the PRC economy.  Second, the PRC did not achieve the economic basis to facilitate a 
transition to democracy.  Finally, rapid economic growth and problems in the late 1980s 
failed to weaken the CCP into liberalizing enough to facilitate democratization.     
Therefore, Adam Przeworski’s argument that “rapid growth is not destabilizing 
for democracies (or for dictatorships),” is true.63  Although South Korea and Taiwan 
democratized during the 1980s, the PRC managed economic and political reform and 
endured public protest in the 1980s and 1990s.  First, the PRC expanded its access to oil 
supplies around the world.  Second, the CCP entrenched and slowed its efforts to 
modernize and reform following the economic crisis that fed into the Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989.  Finally, the CCP’s efforts to control the economic effects that 
destabilized the status quo in other states during the “third wave of democratization” 
renewed economic growth at a slower, more manageable pace. 
3. Pei’s Argument: The Reality in China  
Pei’s work on trapped transition provides a look at China’s economic 
development since 1978 as a developmental autocracy and identifies weaknesses in the 
Chinese economic development.64  First, China’s rapid economic growth and lagging 
reform of its political system had created an environment in which the ruling elites have 
the power to initiate any regime change and where there is no incentive to democratize.  
Second, gradual reform can not be sustained indefinitely because of rent seeking and 
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“mounting costs of inefficiency incurred by path-dependent partial reforms.”  Finally, 
China’s corruption and inability to monitor itself makes the state more likely to turn into 
a predatory state than a developmental state.   
In contrast to the work of Lipset and Huntington that studies the growth and role 
of the middle class, Pei concludes that any democratic transition in China will be initiated 
by elites.65  Unlike the peaceful transitions seen in South Korea and Taiwan, Pei does not 
foresee elites joining those who may seek to transform the political system.   
Having seized political power through the barrel of a gun, a formerly 
revolutionary party, such as the CCP, is unlikely seek its own demise 
through voluntary reform.  However, a developmental autocracy’s 
overriding goal of self-perpetuation is ultimately imperiled by the self-
destructive dynamics found in nearly all autocracies: low political 
accountability, unresponsiveness, collusion, and corruption.66 
D. QUANTIFYING THE GROWTH OF CHINA’S MIDDLE CLASS 
Since 1978, there has been a general increase in per capita income and a shift in 
employment trends in China.  Although just over half of China’s population works 
outside of agriculture, 21.6 percent of the population works in industry and 29.3 percent 
works in the tertiary service sector.67  Combined with an unemployment rate of that 
ranges from 9 to 20 percent, and a comparably small class of business entrepreneurs, the 
size of China’s middle class small compared to the size in democratized states.68  By 
comparison, Taiwan’s economy has a 4.1 percent unemployment rate and Europe has a 
combine rate of 8.5 percent.69 
The increase in wealth in China does indicate that individual Chinese are attaining 
more purchasing power to buy cars and televisions and gaining access to services such as 
cellular mobile phones and the internet.  The increase in income partially validates 
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Lipset’s and Huntington’s arguments that industrialization and modernization in the 
twentieth century has led to economic growth that has played an important role in the 
democratization of authoritarian states.  In China’s case, the CCP has mitigated the 
impact of the economic effects that destabilized other Asian states and lead to regime 
change, and the economic growth, while stunning, is still small when compared to other 
democratic states. 
On the other hand, Pei’s argument helps to validate Prezworksi’s argument.  The 
economic growth in China is empowering the CCP and is not compelling China’s elites 
to liberalize China.  The small size of the middle class and the historic tendency of the 
middle class to be politically conservative early in the economic development phases 
suggest that the middle class will not be leading any revolutions any time soon. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 Although Lipset and Huntington have demonstrated that there is a correlation 
between economic development and democratization, both conclude that economic 
development does not lead to rapid democratization.  In the case of China, China does not 
meet Lipset’s requisites for economic development supporting a democracy. China is 
gradually getting closer the requisites outlined by Lipset, but fails to meet them.  
Therefore, China does not have what Huntington defines as the “economic basis” to 
support the trend of democratization seen in Asia during the “third wave” of 
democratization from 1974 to 1989. In addition, Pei describes a China where 
liberalization has stalled.  In the case of Taiwan, Lipset’s requisites for economic 
development supporting a democracy were met 
Modernization and economic growth, however, have a greater chance of 
sustaining the power of the current regime rather than causing a regime change.  Unless 
one of Huntington’s three economic triggers occurs, the current regime stays in power.  
Therefore, China’s economic growth supports the CCP and not democratization.  
Furthermore, Taiwan’s economic growth does not explain its democratization. 
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 China is transitioning to a state that will meet Lipset’s requisites.  Despite this 
socioeconomic development, the prospect of a democratic transition is unlikely.70  
Taiwan, another Chinese state that has democratized following a period of 
industrialization, modernization and socioeconomic development, shows that meeting 
requisites alone does not make a state democratic or initiates democratization.  Therefore, 
the middle class initiating liberalization of a state is the intervening variable in the 
relationship between socioeconomic development and democratic states.  
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III. CHINA’S MIDDLE CLASS IN DEMOCRATIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter looks at the middle class as the intervening variable in Lipset’s 
modernization theory, the correlation between economic growth and democratic 
government.  First, the traditional role of the middle class in previous regime changes 
according to Barrington Moore’s work on the bourgeois role in democratization is 
examined.  Second, an assessment of China’s middle class is made to determine if it is 
sufficiently liberal to suit Lipset’s framework by determining what the types and roles of 
various Chinese social classes through Dietrich Rueschemeyer’s five social classes 
associated in democratization.  Finally, this chapter examines how an insufficient middle 
class contributes to the failure of democratization prior to, during and after the initial 
stages of a regime change during Huntington’s “third wave” of democratization.  This 
chapter then assesses whether China’s middle class is a viable driver of democratization 
in a country that has yet to sufficiently establish the economic basis for democratization 
identified by Lipset and Huntington. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN DEMOCRATIZATION 
Moore’s work has described a number of outcomes regarding the role of the 
middle class in regime transformation.  One outcome involves middle class leading a 
revolution that results in democratization.  Other possible outcomes are fascism and 
communism as a result of insufficient modernization and distortions in the relation 
between the peasantry and elites.  Moore’s study is still relevant in the case of China, 
where almost half the population is employed in farming, where there is and a growing 
social and economic divide between the haves and have-nots. 
China and Taiwan’s fulfillment of Lipset and Huntington’s economic requisites 
shows that the correlation between economic development and democratization is not 
adequate enough to explain Taiwan’s democratization and to suggest China’s prospects 
for democratization.  Historically, Moore has observed “no bourgeoisie, no democracy,” 
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that there can be no democracy with out a middle class.71 Lipset and Huntington have 
also studied the impact of industrialization on the formation of the middle class and its 
role in democratization.  Huntington states: “economic development promotes the 
expansion of the middle class: a larger and larger proportion of society consists of 
businesspeople, professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants, managers, 
technicians, clerks and sales workers.”72 
In the case of China, Pei has observed a rapid change in the domestic socio-
economic development in China.  As Lipset and Huntington have outlined in their 
democratization studies in the twentieth century, China is experiencing an associated 
growth in its middle class as its economy grows. 
In measurable terms of economic development and social change, China’s 
achievements have been unprecedented in speed, scale and scope. 
Additionally, as market-oriented reforms have made the Chinese economy 
less state centered and more decentralized, economic development has 
turned Chinese society from one that was once tightly controlled by the 
state, into one increasingly autonomous, pluralistic and complex.73 
There is a problem with the correlation between economic growth and 
democratization.  Huntington observes that “democracy is premised, in some measure, on 
majority rule, and democracy is difficult in a situation of concentrated inequalities in 
which a large, impoverished majority confronts a small, wealthy oligarchy.”74  Based on 
this observation, Huntington surmises that democratization is more likely in an 
agricultural state such as nineteenth-century United States or twentieth-century Costa 
Rica and is less likely in a state with a substantially large middle class that has formed 
following sustained industrialization and economic growth.75   Huntington concludes that 
the middle class in a state’s early phases of industrialization and economic growth is not 
necessarily a force for democracy.76 
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This follows the false logic that if there can be no democracy without a middle 
class, and if there can be no middle class without economic growth, then there can be no 
democracy without economic growth.  However, Przeworski, Huntington and Pei have 
established that economic growth and a middle class do not necessarily lead to 
democratization.  Therefore, if economic growth is affected by one of Huntington’s three 
economic effects of the “Third Wave,” then the middle class, like economic growth, stops 
growing and begins to recede.  This statement more accurately describes the events that 
took place in Taiwan.  Asian values, Confusion beliefs, and Chinese nationalism aside, 
the economic impact on the middle class initiated a push for economic and political 
reform where the state would be more responsive to the needs of the people and, more 
importantly, business.  
C. WHO IS CHINA’S MIDDLE CLASS 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer identifies five social classes in South America and 
examines the different orientations toward democratization in relation to the “changing 
dynamics of class power.”77  The push for democratization from large landlords, 
peasantry, urban working class, bourgeoisie, and salaried and professional classes 
depends on the structure and amount of state power, rather than the state’s socioeconomic 
development.  Rueshemeyer’s five classes are useful to help break down and categorize 
China’s changing socioeconomic structure and so to understand to effects of the 
crackdowns on protests in China. 
For the major part of the Twentieth Century, China consists of three predominant 
classes: the landlords, peasantry and urban working class.  Today, Rueshemyer’s landlord 
class can be associated with the CCP.  Since the CCP has the largest stake in maintaining 
control over the land and its arbitrary allocation of it to new domestic and foreign 
industry, the CCP has the largest role as the most anti-democratic force.   
The peasantry has played a large role in China’s Twentieth Century history and 
politics.  After all, Mao defeated the nationalists and consolidated his power during and 
after China’s civil war with the support of the peasantry.  Despite the hardships suffered 
during the Great Leap Forward, China’s peasantry, according to Rueshemyer and Potter, 
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“have an interest in democratization but have acted rarely on their own in support of it.”78  
This appears to be the case for the foreseeable future as more and more Chinese peasants 
participate in limited rural elections.79 
Although not the smallest of the three classes, the urban working class has not 
been a driving force for union rights and suffrage because of the communist social “iron 
rice bowl” system.   The economic reforms of the late 1990s forced China’s state-owned 
enterprises either to become more competitive or to close down, with unintended 
results.80  First, this has produced a large number of unemployed urban workers.  Second, 
it has also left the employed and unemployed without welfare and healthcare.  Finally, 
typical social and political pressures from the urban working class that China did not 
have to face during communism are emerging, and a race has begun to see who will 
control the inevitable push to liberalize: the urban working class, the elite land lord class, 
or the middle class.  
China’s middle class, what Rueschemeyer refers to as the “salaried and 
professional middle class,” is between 9 and 33 percent of China’s population, based on 
an estimate using purchasing power and on use the internet and mobile cellular phones.  
The desire to support democratization is based on the strength of the working class.81  If 
the working class is weak, the middle class supports democratization to strength its own 
status.  If the working class is strong, the middle class is less likely to upset the status 
quo.  
The primary economic interest of the bourgeoisie as a class lies in the 
development and the guarantee of the institutional infrastructure of 
capitalist development – in the institutions of property and contract, in the 
predictability of judicial decisions, in the functioning of markets for 
capital, goods and services, and labor, and in the protection against 
unwelcome state intervention.82 
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1. Liberal versus Conservative 
The last Chapter assesses that China has not yet met Lipset’s social and economic 
requisites that are usually found in existing democracies, but China’s situation is 
improving and its middle class is expanding. However, in the beginning of the Twenty-
first Century, China’s middle class is too conservative to fit Lipset’s model.  According 
to Huntington, an expanding and conservative middle class is typical in most economies 
in the early stages of modernization.  Lipset accounts for this trend and explains that the 
desire for a stable relationship between the state and society is usually more important 
among those who desire democracy.83 
This remains the case in China 17 years after Tiananmen Square.  The middle 
class in China owes its existence to the growing economy before the state.  As long as the 
state continues to choose policies that encourage economic growth and social stability, 
the middle class will remain loyal to the state.  If the state is unresponsive to the middle 
class and the economy, the middle class will seek someone who represents their interests.  
The emergence of China’s middle class and its conservative attitude has not gone 
unnoticed.84  Both U.S. and CCP leaders see this as an indication that China is on its way 
to democratization, but the CCP has taken steps that ensures social and political stability.  
The CCP in a post-Mao era remains relevant by allowing party members to own 
businesses and new business owners membership in the party Giving new business 
owners.  Workers in the city have the opportunity to accumulate wealth and to become an 
essential middle class in China’s modernization.  Peasants are allowed to elect local 
officials.  According to Dickson and Pearson, modernization of China's economic 
development is not leading it any closer to democratization.85  
In addition to displaying a conservative and loyal attitude toward the state, 
China’s middle class is an instrument of suppression.  The disintegration and shift of the 
social functions of the PRC to privatized sectors is empowering the expanding and  
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conservative middle class.  The Chinese rising in power within the business sector are 
more invested in the security of the market and economy rather than democratization for 
workers and farmers.86 
Perry’s Chinese Society offers another view, particularly of the farmers and 
workers, and asserts that they are exploited and not getting rich.87  Costs originally for 
social programs are no longer paid for by the PRC and are not being assumed by the 
private sector that pockets the profit.  Peasants, the power base of Mao’s China, are not as 
large of a class or important in the PRC in the beginning of the Twenty-first Century.  
Furthermore, local elections in agriculture communities have provided an element of 
representation that helps the PRC maintain the status quo and avoids any further push for 
democratization among peasants. 
By 2006, China’s middle class is conservative.  The assumption that the Chinese 
are naturally conservative and are more conservative than other nationalities is 
misleading although there is evidence that portrays Chinese middle class in Hong Kong, 
the PRC and Taiwan as dependant and loyal to the government.88  According to Lipset 
and Huntington, a conservative middle class is typical in any state as long as the 
economy, state and society are stable.  Taiwan, as assessed in Chapter 4, is a case where a 
conservative Chinese middle class pushed enough for democratization without 
revolution.  Although they are conservative, the Chinese are clearly capable of 
demanding democracy. 
2. Confucius versus Realists 
According to Huntington, “’Confucian democracy’ is a contradiction in terms.”  
With the exception of U.S. assistance in Japan and Philippines, few Asian states with a 
strong Confucian society have fully transitioned to a liberal democracy.  In the case of 
China and Taiwan, Huntington predicted that modernization and democratization will be 
especially difficult. 
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Despite the difficulty in democratizing in a Confucian society, Confucian beliefs 
do not prevent the middle class from supporting democratic efforts when the working 
class is weak and economic problems weigh more heavily than economic growth.  
Taiwan provides a case where the middle class supported democratization enough to 
compel elites to reform and liberalize the political system, but remained conservative 
enough to help keep the elites in power.  Since this pattern is also found in developing 
states in Latin America, Confucian or Asian values are not a strong enough variable to 
predict the role of China’s middle class in the prospects for democratization.  
D. THE PROSPECTS FOR FAILURE 
As China transitions from communist to capitalist and as the middle class grows, 
the business elites will become more influential and powerful.  Currently, the elites are 
relatively weak when compared to the CCP and to business elites in developing Latin 
American states.89  This weak bourgeoisie may have dangerous implications for any 
regime change in China and following Moore’s analysis could lead to either a fascist or 
communist state.  
In addition to the rise of the middle class, to the rise of economic factors that 
challenge the state’s rule, and to the prospect of democratization, a premature start to 
democratize or failure to maintain a revolution from above could lead to a new fascist 
regime or reversion to a stronger communist state. As observed by Moore, Japan and 
China experienced revolutions that ended with regimes other than democracies.  In Japan, 
“the landlords allied themselves with the state in an industrializing effort that culminated 
in fascism.”90  In China, “the conservatism of the landlord-oriented bureaucracy served to 
inhibit modernization, and the peasants provided the revolutionary force that led to the 
establishment of communism.”91 
Huntington’s study of the “third wave” of democratization reveals a number of 
states that have failed to democratize, or have democratized and reverted to another 
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authoritarian regime.92  Weak democratic values, social conflicts triggered by an 
economic downturn, rapid and massive social and economic reforms, the exclusion 
reformists in the new regime, the emergence of terrorism or insurgency, the intervention 
by a non-democratic foreign government, or political unrest in neighboring states spilling 
over have led to reversals in democratization during the “third wave.” 
E. CONCLUSION  
Socioeconomic development in China and Taiwan has resulted in a growing 
middle class, the intervening variable in the relationship between socioeconomic 
development and democracy.  Moore explains the emergence of Western style democracy 
as the evolving struggle “to check arbitrary rulers, to replace arbitrary rules with just and 
rational ones, and to obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of 
rules.”93  Historically, the middle class is essential for regime change to successfully end 
in a Western, liberal democracy.   
The social and economic evolution of China so that and the small size and 
reluctant role of China’s middle class suggests that the PRC is not ready for 
democratization as described by Lipset and Huntington.  A weak Chinese middle class, 
whether it is too small or worse not to support the opposition to the existing regime, will 
contribute to the formation of a fascist or a new communist state, depending on the 
comparative strength between the elites and peasantry by Moore’s theory.  The economic 
stage of China, its neighbors and the international community, and the lack of democratic 
institutions, would also suggest that democratization, such as that seen in Taiwan, would 
be less likely. 
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IV. TAIWAN CASE STUDY: ASIAN MIDDLE CLASS AT WORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter compares the reform and liberalization process in Taiwan that led to 
the expansion of its middle class and its eventual democratization in the 1990s to the 
reforms undertaken in the PRC since 1978.  Although Moore says there can be no 
democracy without a middle class, Lipset says there can be no middle class without 
sufficient economic and social development that follows industrialization.  Comparing 
these two states may help illustrate the political impact of China’s changing 
socioeconomic development as the KMT and CCP adopted economic and political 
reforms allowed Taiwan’s middle class to expand and China’s middle class to reemerge 
since the founding of the PRC.  First, economic reforms facilitate industrialization and 
modernization.  Second, political reforms liberalize the state to be more responsive to the 
needs of the middle class.  Despite institutional and political differences, Taiwan is an 
adequate model for China’s democratization because it shows how a Chinese-Leninist 
state ruled by a single party liberalized sufficiently that has allowed both sustained 
socioeconomic development and democratization over a 10-year period. 
B. THE TWO ECONOMIES: THE RISE OF TAIWAN AND CHINA 
Following the Second World War and Chinese Civil War, China and Taiwan 
ended up on two different paths to rebuild their deteriorated economies.  Each adopted 
similar policies to industrialize and modernize their economies: pushing heavy industry 
and the labor force.  According to Lipset, this is the initial step necessary for the 
expansion of the middle class.  The CCP and KMT, however, adopted different policies 
regarding the development of small and medium sized enterprises, and their orientation 
towards the global market which explains why the middle class in Taiwan and the PRC 
developed at different times.  The comparison between Taiwan’s and China’s economic 
performance from the end of WWII up to 1996 shows how the two states adopted similar 
policies, but took different approaches. 
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1. The Comparison 
1949 to 1978, the KMT and CCP were broadly similar in terms of political and 
economic ideology.  Both believed in state led industrialization to modernize China for 
the eventual reunification.  Both responded to political crisis in the 1970s with economic 
policies to enhance the party’s control and international stature. 
Following the KMT’s exodus from China to Taiwan, industry in both states 
underwent a sweeping change in ownership.  The PRC took ownership of China’s heavy 
industries which formerly had been mainly owned mainly by the Republic of China.  The 
KMT took ownership of Taiwan’s heavy industries, which had previously been owned by 
the native Taiwanese following the withdrawal of Japan after WWII.94  In addition, both 
sided with one of the two superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union. 
Taiwan’s economy was based on export-led industrialization and efficient small 
and medium-sized enterprises, with support of inefficient state-owned enterprises, made 
Taiwan competitive globally.95  Industrialization and economic development were state 
priorities to balance Taiwan’s financial dependency of the United States.96  But large 
enterprises were restricted by the KMT out of fear of the creation of political rivals.97  
Similarly, the PRC dominated control and planning of its heavy industry for the purpose 
of reducing its dependency of the Soviet Union’s assistance following the Nikita 
Khrushchev’s decision to withdrawal Soviet support from China in 1960.98 
State control over industry, while pushing industrialization, did have 
consequences in Taiwan and China.  ROC attempts to expand economic growth failed 
with its attempt to build an auto industry and reform the petrochemical industry in the 
1970s, a critical time for the KMT to legitimize its rule of Taiwan following the eventual 
normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC, and the loss of                                                  
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recognition in the international community.99  The CCP also initiated policies that had 
huge human and capital costs such as the Great Leap Forward, Third Front and Cultural 
Revolution.100 
Events in the 1970s forced the CCP and KMT to undertake similar economic 
policies.  Although the 1950s required the CCP and KMT leaders to push 
industrialization, the 1970s saw adoption of policies on both sides of the strait intended 
either strengthen the private sector or to create one.  Loss of political recognition as a 
sovereign state by the international community created a political crisis for the KMT.  In 
the PRC, Mao’s death and Deng’s rise to power created a new political environment that 
permitted sweeping reforms in the CCP, PLA and the Chinese economy.   
Due to growing tension between ruling Chinese of the KMT and the Taiwanese 
middle class, Chiang Ching-kuo pushed for reforms in the KMT to commence the 
Taiwanization of local politics and to reduce growing domestic and international pressure 
on the KMT to end its decades long period of martial law.101  Deng ushered in reforms 
that allowed China to transition toward a market economy.  More importantly, the 
transition to a market economy allowed China to take advantage of the normalization of 
relations between the United States and PRC.  This normalization opened access to 
Western technology and gave China the access to Western markets that Taiwan had 
enjoyed for decades. 
The ROC established specific areas to accelerate Taiwan’s export trade, resulting 
in the establishment of the Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone (KEPZ) in 1966.  This 
was expanded into two additional EPZs following a 58 percent increase in the export of 
electronic goods between 1966 and 1971.102  More than a decade later, Deng would 
follow with special economic zones (SEZ) to develop China’s coastal industrial and 
economic base, reversing Mao’s 1960s Third Front Movement, by which industry was 
transplanted to more remote interior sectors of China.  
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By 1996, the CCP and KMT had taken additional steps to ensure political and 
economic stability.  Taiwan held its first presidential elections between two opposing 
parties, the final step towards democratizing over a decade.103  The CCP, on the other 
hand, proceeded to allow party members to remain active in the CCP while owning new 
and privatized state owned enterprises and co-opting emerging Chinese entrepreneurs and 
business men into the CCP.104  Although one state took a step toward liberalization and 
the other toward retaining political power, both actions were taken to preserve stability. 
2. The Contrast 
 The difference in economic growth in the PRC and Taiwan explains why 
Taiwan’s middle class was ready in the 1980s to demand democratization, why it finally 
committed itself to democracy in 1996 and why China’s middle class is only just 
beginning to emerge.  Although both states went to great lengths to control their heavy 
industry and resources, the KMT and CCP had different approaches toward small and 
medium enterprises and the traditional Chinese economy.  Finally, Taiwan and China had 
unequal access to markets and technology. 
Taiwan’s economy was “down stream” driven, where consumers and small 
enterprises drove large enterprise production.105  China’s economy was “up stream” 
driven where the state decided the use and production of resources and large industry.106  
The different approach largely determined the difference in economic growth between 
Taiwan and China.107  While the KMT pushed for rapid industrialization in the face of 
renewed communist attacks, the traditional Taiwanese economy was not replaced.  
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largely outside of the KMT’s direct control.108  By the 1970s and 1980s, small and 
medium enterprises accounted for nearly half of Taiwan’s productivity and export 
value.109 
 In addition to the different approach to small and medium enterprises, the CCP 
resorted to policies that rapidly changed the way China’s economy worked.  The CCP 
invested large amounts of money and resources into non-traditional Chinese industry at 
the expense of developing China’s main source of revenue, agriculture.110  Furthermore, 
industry and large enterprises established along the coast were abandoned in favor of 
Soviet models.111 
 The KMT and CCP, functioned differently from each other.  Despite bureaucratic 
politics, the KMT was divided into camps of the Chiang family and non-family 
mainlanders, and kept itself in check and was highly competitive with its industry and 
resources.112  The CCP, however, was managed solely by Mao’s discretion and was 
purged of leaders who attempted to circumvent Mao’s economic planning with their own 
attempts of economic recovery following the Great Leap Forward.113  
The Cold War also played a critical role in Taiwan’s and the PRC’s economic 
development and explains why the middle class formed in Taiwan earlier than the PRC.  
Soviet and Maoist economic models focused China’s economy on inward, self-sufficient 
development.  Western political and economic isolation of China and the Soviet bloc 
limited Chinese access to foreign investment, technology and markets.  On the other side 
of the strait, Taiwan benefited from financial support from the United States, access to 
Western markets, technology and investment, and recognition as the legitimate 
government of China until the 1970s. 
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3. Conclusion 
The KMT and CCP adopted similar policies but had different approaches with 
Taiwan’s and China’s small business and traditional economies.  Therefore, the middle 
class emerged in Taiwan and the PRC at different times following the creation of the 
PRC and ROC.  While both states dominated the control of Taiwan’s and China’s 
resources and heavy industry, Taiwan allowed small businesses to operate more freely 
than large enterprises.  Farming was also allowed to modernize under the KMT, while the 
CCP imposed detrimental economic policies on China’s farmers.   Therefore, Taiwan’s 
middle class formed shortly after its creation and China’s never matured until more 
efficient farming practices and economic reforms allowed Chinese farmers to seek 
additional employment in the metropolitan areas. 
Despite the bureaucratic politics, corruption and inefficiency, Taiwan had access 
to Western markets that were growing faster than communist bloc markets.  But now that 
China has increasing access to growing Western markets, with the help of Taiwanese 
investment, it is conceivable that the same socioeconomic trends that occurred in Taiwan 
will occur in China.  Although the economic policies and growth diverged following the 
Chinese Civil War and start of the Cold War, China’s economy and economic policies 
are likely to intersect those of Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s, when economic reforms 
eventually gave way to political reforms. 
C. THE TWO STATES 
China’s growing reliance on globalization and foreign investment to fuel its 
modernization has made it more susceptible to a domestic oil crisis or economic crisis 
and so potentially to a political crisis.   Although China’s growing economy helps 
strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s rule, Lipset’s theory on modernization and 
Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan’s research on democratic transition suggest that China is 
vulnerable to regime change.  First, China has transitioned from totalitarianism to a post-
totalitarian regime, with the likelihood of transition into a hard and soft authoritarian 
state.  Second, experts agree that China is changing economically, socially and 
politically, and project three likely paths for the PRC to follow.  Finally, although China 
remained authoritarian during the “third wave” of democratization, its current path to 
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modernization is likely to lead to a Taiwanese roadmap to limited democracy: economic 
liberalization that leads to an expanding middle class and an authoritarian government 
forced to democratize.  The fact that China continues to transition and survive while other 
totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have collapsed suggests that the Chinese 
Communist Party will continue to change in order to remain in power at the expense of 
its brief and traumatic communist heritage. 
According to Lipset, political and economic instability and crisis increase the 
potential of regime change or liberalization.  Lipset’s theory of modernization in regard 
to democracies describes the sustainability of a government, including non-democratic 
governments, with a strong economy.114  Therefore, economic instability can threaten the 
political stability of a government.  Instability will lead either to change from the losing 
middle and working classes or from the elites in order to prevent a political crisis. 
Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan describe the type of regime China has in terms of 
Twentieth Century democratization.  Linz and Stephan’s research helps to pair China and 
Taiwan side-by-side to understand how far China is from democratization.115  Taiwan’s 
liberalization in the 1980’s started when it displayed attributes of both a democratic and 
authoritarian regime.  Its party, the KMT, had limited but not responsible pluralism and a 
self-proclaimed national leadership in the Republic of China National Assembly.  
However, Taiwan did have an existing, although limited, liberal and constitutional 
political institution, a self-mobilized middle class, and had free local elections with KMT 
and independent candidates. 
China, however, remains in Linz and Stephan’s post-totalitarian category of 
states.  There is no political pluralism, there is a weakened commitment to its communist 
ideology, and the leadership is still self-proclaimed and empowered by the Chinese 
Communist Party in spite of limited, local elections.  The exception to China’s post-
totalitarian state is the status of mobilization.  Although the state remains ritualized in 
communist tradition, the coastal economic centers are arguably more mobilized and have 
to the potential to influence the authoritarian state more than the state can influence the 
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economic centers.  This could result in China’s middle class becoming more mobilized 
and displaying more attributes similar to Taiwan’s middle class. 
1. The Taiwanese Roadmap and how the PRC is Already on It 
The political, economic and security interests that followed 1949 allowed Chiang 
Kai-shek to rebuild the ROC in Taiwan under the KMT’s rule without much significant 
opposition.  With the KMT’s ranks decimated following its defeat to Mao and its 
evacuation to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek rebuilt the KMT’s cadre of officers and created a 
new middle class in Taiwan.  By the 1970s, a new domestic and international 
environment emerged that altered the needs of Taiwan’s middle class.116  By the 1980s, 
KMT and opposition leaders responded to the increasingly mobilized middle class which 
led to the end of martial law, legitimacy of opposing political parties and national 
elections.  Like Taiwan, the PRC faces similar challenges as it continues to modernize 
and has adopted similar solutions to addressing these challenges which suggests that a 
similar approach to democratization is possible. 
Taiwan’s democratization had three elements.117  First, leaders from the KMT 
and Democratic Progressive Party resolved political conflicts and promoted stability.  
Second, a common path to political liberalization was agreed upon by the KMT and DPP.  
Finally, a balance between confrontation and tolerance was reached to establish a new 
political culture.  The PRC had its share of powerful leaders and reforms that parallel the 
leaders and reforms in Taiwan. 
A fourth element not mentioned is Taiwan’s middle class.  During Chiang Kai-
shek’s rule, Taiwan’s middle class owed its prosperity primarily to the KMT.  As 
economic and political concerns became more important than security concerns among 
Taiwan’s middle class, the more pressure was put on the KMT to respond to growing 
issues of unemployment and pollution.  Profitable and expanding small and medium size 
businesses outside of KMT ownership allowed an increasing number of independent 
candidates to compete against well funded KMT candidates and win local elections in the 
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late 1970s and early 1980s.118  Without the middle class shifting its favor away from the 
KMT and toward the DPP, leaders such as Chiang Ching-kuo, and Lee Teng-hui would 
never have taken the necessary steps to democratize.  Furthermore, the DPP would not 
have agreed to such compromises with the KMT without the middle class remaining 
loyal to the KMT and appreciative of its compromises with the DPP.  The middle class 
was conservative enough and liberal enough to foster conditions that provide a Taiwanese 
roadmap to democratization. 
In addition to the fact that China and Taiwan share similar cultures, China’s 
government is approaching an intersection that could take it onto the path of 
democratization that Taiwan has taken.  The variables include institutional reforms and 
military professionalization.  The first variable is the institutionalization of the 
government under three key KMT leaders--Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and Lee 
Teng-hui--to ensure that the government remained stable.  The other variable is the 
professionalization of the military in order to ensure the military remains politically 
neutral and under civilian control, especially during democratic transition.   
Deng’s reforms of the CCP in the 1980s are reminiscent of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
reforms of Taiwan’s KMT in the 1950s.  Both leaders undertook institutional reforms 
necessary to survive and prosper in a competitive and interconnected global community.  
Unlike Chiang Ching-kuo’s liberalization and ground work for Taiwanese 
democratization, Deng’s liberalization was directed to the economic and political 
reformation of the PRC.   Once Chiang Kai-shek moved the KMT to Taiwan, socio-
economic modernization was instituted.  Education and the economy were viewed as 
essential elements to the survival and rebuilding of the ROC in Taiwan and to the defeat 
of the CCP in China.119  Education was required to nurture and recruit new cadres to 
replace party losses following the KMT evacuation to Taiwan.  Economic strength was 
required to rebuild the military.  But most importantly, education and economic 
modernization was required to win and maintain the support of the reluctant Taiwanese 
population. 
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The second important leader was Chiang Ching-kuo, who was compelled to 
initiate Taiwan’s liberalization in 1986.120  First, he shared his father’s thinking, Chiang 
Kai-shek, that Taiwanese democratization was essential for the KMT to complete its 
mission to bring democracy to China.  Second, his health had deteriorated by 1986 and he 
realized he had to act before it was too late.  Third, he had a vice president and successor, 
Lee Teng-hui, who would ensure Taiwan’s democratic transition.  Finally, international 
isolation and non-recognition as a state in 1979 had turned into international pressure to 
complete liberal democratization. 
The final important leader was Lee, an educated, native Taiwanese KMT party 
member.121  He had popular support and legitimacy to control protestors and the military 
to ensure protests were brief and non-violent.  He consolidated party power and managed 
to keep a divided party united and under his rule.  His efforts to continue liberalization 
resulted in free national elections in 1992 and presidential elections in 1996 with the 
KMT remaining in control until 2000. 
The KMT’s relatively bloodless reign over Taiwan from 1949 to 2000, survival 
after democratization and free elections is a testament to the KMT’s policies and 
ideology.  During the authoritarian rule of the KMT, the KMT’s policies were directed to 
protect its legitimacy by balancing authoritarianism and democracy under the treat of 
communist Chinese subversion and the growing opposition movement. 122  The legacy of 
its socioeconomic policies helped the KMT maintain its majority rule over Taiwan for 14 
years after liberalization because most Taiwanese viewed the KMT as the best option for 
stability and growth.123 
Equally important to political reform is the professionalization of the ROC 
military.  Party control over the military and government meant that the military had 
equal control in the government, particularly internal security.  The professionalization, 
or neutralization of the military, was primarily due to the strong leadership of Chiang  
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Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui.  Although it raised questions, the military never went 
against Chiang’s liberalization, lifting of martial law, and orders to ignore the opposition 
party.124   
Equally important, Lee marginalized the powerful and influential Chief of the 
General Staff Hau Pei-tsun.125  By 1992, Hau had appointed 75 percent of the generals 
who were on active duty and repeatedly opposed further liberalization and Taiwanese 
independence.126  Lee made three important decisions to make the military politically 
neutral.127  First, Lee appeased the conservatives and military by delaying further 
liberalization and democratization until his power as president could be consolidated.  
Second, Lee saw to Hau’s appointment as premier which forced him to leave military 
service and resign his commission.  Finally, Lee appointed flag officers from the Air 
Force and Navy into senior positions to weaken the conservative army position. 
These actions bogged down the former general with the new duties as premier, 
limited his time on military affairs, and prevented him from legally returning to military 
service.  The KMT’s poor performance in the 1992 national elections presented Lee with 
the opportunity to force the cabinet and Hau to resign from public office.  By the 1996 
presidential elections, Hau had negligible popular and military support to be a threat to 
continued democratization. 
2. The PRC’s Path to a Taiwanese Roadmap of Transition 
Although the PRC is defined and scarred by the legacies of Marxist, Leninist and 
Maoist ideologies, the CCP’s capacity to undertake reforms similar to those of the KMT 
suggests that CCP will be able to find a way to meet the demand for democratization 
when it comes.  Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping strongly advocated separate versions of 
communist ideology, and Mao, Deng and Jiang Zemin maneuvered and advocated 
different policy positions in order to advance their own interests in a ruthless struggle for 
personal power by exploiting ideology.  Each PRC leader deviated from the ideology of 
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Marx and Lenin for personal reasons.  The ideologies, power bases, and policies of 
Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Deng’s economic reforms and Jiang’s 
“three represents” explain each leader’s pursuit to consolidate personal power and 
security from opposition.   
Following the Communist victory over the KMT in 1949 and the formation of the 
PRC, Mao advocated a Soviet style of communist Ideology and implemented several 
flawed and failed campaigns.  Mao ruthlessly used communist ideology of class struggle 
and the Peoples Liberation Army to perpetuate a personality cult.  Mao fell back on a 
ruthless approach with the instigation of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution after 
facing growing opposition from the party.  Because of his growing political isolation, 
Mao launched the Cultural Revolution and employed his three bases of power: the 
disenchanted urban youth and students who made up the Red Guard, his control over the 
PLA under Lin Biao, and the personality cult guided by Jiang Qing.128 
Mao’s role in the CCP of final arbiter in policy created the role of Mao Zedong 
Thought in party policy.129  Although his aura and credibility were tarnished from the 
failures of the Hundred Flowers campaign and Great Leap Forward, Lin Biao and Jiang 
Qing reenergized and elevated Mao’s personality cult with the PLA.  With Lin Biao’s 
distribution of Quotations from Chairman Mao and the Sino-Soviet split, Lin Biao and 
Jiang Qing elevated Mao to religious idol status and mobilized enough popular support to 
launch the Cultural Revolution to remove political opposition. 
Mao used the PLA to crush the Nationalists, the Red Guard, and ultimately Lin 
Biao’s coup attempt.  Prior to the Cultural Revolution, Mao and Lin increased the PLA’s 
control over the civilian population in 1962 by ordering civilian militias formed under the 
PLA.130  Personal control over the military was enhanced with Lin’s removal of the 
ranking system, which weakened the officer corps and placed more power with the  
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officers actually politically appointed to powerful positions.131  Lin Biao’s distribution of 
Quotations from Chairman Mao to the PLA’s soldiers and recruits helped to ensure 
loyalty to Mao over the PLA and CCP. 
Mao’s Cultural Revolution was a “quest for revolutionary purity in a post-
revolutionary age.”132  The failures of the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s self imposed 
separation from the party meetings, and CCP’s policies following the Great Leap 
Forward left Mao isolated and unable to reenter the post revolutionary political scene.133  
Since Mao wanted to remove leftist and revisionists in the party who opposed his 
policies, Mao encouraged party officials to be available to the Red Guard for questioning 
and struggle.134  Once the Red Guard threatened to lose control over the revolution and 
threaten Mao’s power base in the PLA, Mao reined in the Red Guards and unleashed the 
PLA on the youth and student followers.  Therefore, the Cultural Revolution removed 
“revisionists,” intellectuals, political opposition, and the masses of student revolutionaries 
from the PRC’s cities and political centers.    
The turmoil caused by Mao Zedong’s power and decision to start the Cultural 
Revolution revealed the power that future CCP leaders would jockey to either achieve or 
eliminate.  Deng Xiaoping used communist ideology to win support in the CCP following 
the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s death, to mobilize support for economic 
modernization, and to promote reforms in the CCP and PLA.  Deng preached traditional 
party rhetoric to win party support and began institutionalization of the PLA and to start 
economic reforms.  
Deng advocated the ideology of socialist modernization as the next step to line 
with communism, but avoided the devastating collapse of Soviet Communism and to 
sustain party control amidst globalization.  Deng’s “four cardinal principles” were 
adherence to the socialist road, the people’s democratic dictatorship, Communist Party 
Leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought.135  The principles ensured a 
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peaceful and secure transition of power for Deng and opened the possibility of reforming 
socialism away from pure Mao Zedong thought and party control over the government 
and PLA. 
Deng’s power, like Mao, relied on support of the PLA.  Deng sought to separate 
the party from government.  The death of Mao and marginalization of Hua Guofeng 
underscores the need for reforms to ensure the professionalization and political neutrality 
of the PLA.  To ensure continued support to Deng’s policies of reform and 
institutionalization, he removed conservative CCP and PLA influence.  First, Deng 
created a state Military Affairs Commission to parallel the party’s MAC.136  Second, 
Deng sought to retire aging PLA hardliners, both within and outside of the PLA, and 
reorganized the PLA by reassigning security responsibilities from the PLA to the 
People’s Armed Police. 137 
After gaining sufficient support from the CCP and PLA, Deng established the 
special economic zones that helped China’s economy to modernize to current global 
standards in order to meet the Chinese people’s need for material wealth and improved 
livelihoods, and necessary for continued legitimate rule under the CCP.138  Deng’s 
reforms in the CCP and PLA helped to institutionalize the succession in the CCP and 
allowed Jiang Zemin, a Shanghai party member, to succeed Deng after two handpicked 
successors for the top CCP position failed.  A relative political outsider, Jiang 
perpetuated Deng’s economic and political reforms with the “Three Represents” and 
consolidated his power with the promotion of Shanghai party members.  Due to Deng’s 
success in retiring, reforming and institutionalizing the CCP, Jiang continued Deng’s 
economic reforms and central Communist party rule.  Jiang has overseen the 
modernization of the PLA and reaffirmed the PRC’s position opposing Taiwanese 
independence.   
China has both suffered and benefited from the power struggles of Mao Zedong, 
Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.  Ideology served each leader by mobilizing the Chinese 
to secure a safe political environment for the leader to consolidate power.  Ideology                                                  
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served an important role in the Mao’s pursuit for personal security and power, and it 
aided Deng’s and Jiang’s use of reforms for institutionalization to prevent another 
Cultural Revolution that nearly destroyed China from within.  Mao’s Cultural Revolution 
elevated his personality cult, dissolved the growing opposition from the failure of the 
Great Leap Forward, and dispersed the disenchanted youth and students throughout the 
countryside.   Deng’s reforms disestablished the power base that Mao and would be-
Mao’s relied upon to control, consolidated power with the CCP following Mao’s death 
and ensured continued CCP rule amidst political and economic reforms and avoided 
conservative and PLA intervention.  Jiang sustained CCP legitimacy, consolidated his 
own power from his Shanghai base of power, and perpetuated Deng’s economic reforms 
for modernization with the “three represents.”   
3. Conclusion 
Despite any institutional differences between Taiwan and the PRC, Taiwan’s 
democratization is an excellent case to study because of the economic and political 
policies used by the KMT and CCP to strengthen political and security interests have 
resulted in the expansion of a middle class that owes its loyalty to the economy over the 
government.  As a result of these policies, the middle class in Taiwan and China started at 
different times in the Twentieth Century, but will eventually end in the same way: 
instruments of democratization.  The KMT facilitated the creation of a cadre of middle 
class for political and security reasons since 1949.  The CCP imposed detrimental 
policies that prevented the creation of a middle class until Deng’s reforms in 1978.  
However, the economies of Taiwan and China have superseded the state’s ability to 
control the growth of the middle class.  Therefore, the middle class owes its allegiance 
more to the economy than the state. 
The KMT established the middle class, but a change in policy resulted in an 
expanding middle class that owed its loyalty more to the success of Taiwan’s economy 
rather than to the success of its government.  The CCP never developed a middle class, 




expanding economy.  Only after the CCP and KMT imposed policies conducive to 
economic liberalization did the middle class expand into the numbers and liberal potential 
outlined by Lipset. 
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V. REPLICATING TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although Taiwanese and Chinese leaders have adopted economic and political 
reform policies to adapt to the economic and political realities faced by most 
authoritarian states during the “third wave” of democratization, the combined experience 
from observing the developmental states of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan offers several 
lessons learned that should be considered in any future policies that deal with nation-
building, economic aid, trade and democratization.  First, there are differences between 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China.  Second, there are similarities between Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan and China.  Third, there is a correlation between U.S. policy and 
the growth of the developmental states.  Understanding the conditions that compelled 
Taiwan’s leaders to liberalize Taiwan’s economy, and subsequently expand its middle 
class, helps understand the challenges faced by China’s middle class before it can 
democratize. 
There are differences between Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China that 
supports the belief that no one model explains the economic growth in the developmental 
states.  The histories, politics, and business structures and practices in Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and China are too varied to make accurate comparisons among these East 
and Western economies or comparisons among Asian economies.139  Japan and South 
Korea are dominated by large, business conglomerates.  Taiwan is dominated by small 
and medium businesses.   
On the other hand, there are similarities that can help understand how and why the 
developmental states did expand economically when other states did not.  First, 
government intervention was tailored to meet each state’s repeated domestic and national 
security challenges.  Second, international intervention was tailored to support each state 
to develop a stable governing regime or authoritarian state.  Finally, each state pursued its 
own path to economic liberalization and democratization.   
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B. THE ROLE OF WAR 
According to Richard Stubbs, the role of “hot” wars during and after World War 
Two and the Cold War “significantly shaped the political and economic institutions that 
emerged in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.140  From this observation, Stubbs offers five 
lessons from the developmental states.141  First, the Cold War in Asia and the Korean 
War were essential in the rapidly changing global political economy.  Second, national 
security concerns about external and internal threats are important to the international 
global economy.  Third, political, economic and social factors are important in how and 
why the global political economy emerged.  Fourth, institutions, whether effective in 
anticipating or reacting to crisis, were important contributors to promoting stability, 
continuity and coherence in domestic and global political economies.  Finally, unlike 
Latin America, Central Asia, South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, “the sequence of 
wars that engulfed East and Southeast Asia was a unique occurrence and is the decisive 
factor which drew capital into East and Southeast Asia and provided the motive for the 
creation of strong states”  
C. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has had a profound 
impact in the economic development of Northeast Asia.  U.S. Cold War policies 
responsible for stabilizing the economic and political reconstruction of Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, and the isolation of China eventually evolved and forced the 
developmental states to pursue more robust policies.  The change in U.S. policy at the 
conclusion of the Vietnam War forced Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to reevaluate 
economic planning and political rule.  In addition, U.S. military presence withdrawal 
from Asia following the Vietnam War signaled the U.S. intention of protecting its own 
interests at the expense of the autonomy of the Northeast Asian developmental states.  
Each developmental state found itself in a situation where it could not longer rely 
on U.S. support.  Following the U.S. military pullout from Vietnam, the end of the 
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Vietnam War, and the reduction of U.S. forces from South Korea, Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan realized that the United States could not be relied upon in the defense of 
Northeast Asia.142   Japan was never notified ahead of time of President Nixon’s efforts 
to normalize relations between China and the United States.  President Nixon redeployed 
troops out of South Korea.  The United States shifted recognition of China’s sovereignty 
to the PRC and away from the ROC.   
Each developmental state has found the United States to be an obstacle.  
Politically, each is not a “normal” state.  Each is militarily closely aligned with the 
United States, with the exception of Taiwan.  Taiwan cannot make itself independent.  
South Korea cannot unilaterally negotiate with North Korea.  Japan cannot severe its 
post-world war two legacy.  Economically, each state has had to comply with U.S. 
economic policy terms of liberalization that has not proven beneficial.  Only China 
weathered the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, primarily because its currency was not 
convertible. Finally, the WTO, IMF and U.S. efforts to aid economies following the 
Crisis proved more effective in rebuilding U.S. business interests’ confidence and less 
effective in fixing the problems that created the crisis. 
D. ROLE OF THE STATE 
Although David Kang states there is no single explanation for the economic 
growth and democratization in Taiwan and South Korea, there are similar instances of 
government and international intervention that can help policy makers determine the best 
approach to producing the desired result of economically stable democracies in Northeast 
Asia.143 
Neo-classical explanations attempt either to down play the state’s involvement or 
to blame the state for intervening and slowing down economic growth.144  Kang points 
out that the state was the central player in the developmental state’s economy.145  First, 
the states have the power to provide subsidies.  Second, the state controls the banking that 
                                                 
142 David C. Kang. “South Korean and Taiwanese Development and the New Institutional 
Economics,” International Organization, Vol, 49, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), 584. 
143 Kang, 587. 
144 Ibid., 558. 
145 Ibid., 559. 
52 
is capable of extending loans.  Third, the state and elites have control and ownership of 
the business eligible for subsidies and loans.  Finally, the capability of keeping costs 
down by depriving the labor force of a complex social welfare system.   
Japan’s modernization during the Meiji period was possible due to the perception 
of a foreign threat, the use of nationalism, and the lack of domestic opposition.146  
Raphael attributes this to a homogeneous population, strong national identity, and the 
state’s ability to manipulated personal ambition into patriotism.147  Therefore, the 
likelihood of Japan’s success, planning and modeling spreading to the rest of Asia is 
unlikely.148 
South Korean and Taiwanese modernization was possible due to the existence of 
an external threat that allowed the state to provide incentives for industrialization and to 
rationalize direct intervention in political and economic domains.”149  Kang states that 
internal and external threats to the elites’ power strongly compelled their developmental 
strategies.  First, the state made concessions and gave incentives to elites and businesses 
to develop large and heavy industry.150  In the case of South Korea and Taiwan, the 
governments were spending 4 to 5 percent and 12 percent of their annual GDPs in 
defense respectively.151 Second, the perception of an attack reduced domestic opposition 
to authoritarian rule.152  In addition to increasing the external and internal security, 
investors’ confidence was increased and permitted stability for financial investment.153 
As important as the beginning of the Cold War and end of the Vietnam War were 
to the developmental states, the end of the Cold War era ushered in a new stage where 
developmental states liberalized both economically and politically.  Faced with a 
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diminishing external threat, opposition to authoritarian rule was unimpeded.  As a result, 
South Korea and Taiwan commenced democratization in the 1980s.  
E. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Kuznets claims that there is an East Asian economic development model and that 
it is replicable when five economic factors are taken into consideration: high investment 
ratios, small public sectors, competitive labor markets, export expansion, and government 
intervention in the state’s economy.154  With the exception of over-crowding and scarcity 
of natural resources, the economic characteristics are controllable and are designed to 
overcome the handicaps of lack of resources and population control.155  Furthermore, the 
replication of the economic growth depends on the recreation of the same historical 
events and non-economic characteristics.156 
Finally, there is the prospect of an unplanned, controllable economic variable 
such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Such an event tests the effectiveness of policies 
and institutions.  In the case of the developmental economic model of East Asia, it did not 
respond well enough to an economic crisis such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis.157  
Kuznet’s explanation is the inherent nature of the Asian institutions anticipating problems 
rather then being structured to react to them.158 
F. CONCLUSION 
The East Asian developmental states demonstrate the following lessons learned in 
economic modeling.  First, despite the differences among the developmental states, 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan grew economically.  Second, external and internal 
security threats forced elites to protect their interests.  Third, the United States helped to 
shape the security picture in East Asia.  Fourth, the state arranged incentives for 
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industrialization and business expansion.  Finally, the role of history and non-economic 
factors provide uncontrollable variables when considering replication of the economic 
model. 
The East Asian developmental states demonstrate the following lessons learned in 
economic modeling.  First, Lipset’s theory on economic growth sustaining a democratic 
or non-democratic state is valid.  Second, real economic growth and planning only comes 
after an economic problem.  Third, resource-poor states with national security concerns 
are more likely to implement a successful developmental state strategy. 
In the case of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Przeworski’s assessment of 
modernization empowering both democracies and non-democracies alike is valid.  
Particularly for South Korea and Taiwan, the unwavering political support and financial 
aid prior to the Vietnam War resulted in states with little democracy and little need for 
successful economic planning.  Following the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, 
U.S. political and financial involvement in Asia diminished, and Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan were forced to reconsider their economic planning.  Taiwan and South Korea had 
to maintain legitimacy and enhance economic growth at a time when the U.S. was the 
least likely to support them.  Finally, the lack of natural resources and the end of the 
imperialism era forced Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to create more powerful export 
industries and to utilize the large, educated work force and favorable ties with the West. 
Although a homogeneous population and a Confucian belief system are 
mentioned as factors, these are irrelevant unless categorized.  East Asia’s advantage in 
homogeneous population and Confucianism is relevant due to the era.  Without the tribal 
issues of Africa, religious tensions of the Middle East, and a new peace between China 
and the United States, East Asia was the most stable and peaceful area in the world that 
could provide cheap exports at a competitive price.  In the U.S. Global War on Terrorism, 
this remains the case. 
Therefore, the United States needs to do the following concerning the lessons 
learned from the developmental East Asian states.  First, government intervention to 
establish stability and security over the economy is good.  Government intervention 
aimed at maintaining or expanding corruption is not.  Second, international intervention 
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to convert developmental economies and states into permanent western economies and 
states is good.  International intervention aimed at saving the West’s financial interests at 
the expense of Asia has proven to be ineffective in solving the inherent weaknesses in the 
developmental economies.   
China’s prospects of following the same path of economic growth as Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan are increased if the lessons are followed, and the historical, economic 
and non-economic events are closely reproduced.  This requires the continued perception 
of an internal and external threat to the PRC, the active involvement of the United States 
and other international players, and the PRC’s intervention in the development of China’s 
economy.  Just as the Cold War in Asia was filled with contradictions, the post-Cold War 
era will be dominated with contradictions and compromises essential to the continued 





























Since Deng Xiaoping instituted economic reforms under the “reform and open” 
policy in 1978, the Chinese Communist Party has overseen a gradualist approach to 
modernizing China’s economy.  A new Chinese middle class has emerged with China’s 
economic reforms and economic growth.  According to Seymour Lipset’s modernization 
theory, there is a strong relationship between socioeconomic development and the 
emergence of democratic politics accompanying the growth of an educated middle class 
that will demand democratization as a means to achieve more participation in politics.     
This thesis assessed the validity of Lipset’s argument that socioeconomic 
development is likely to result in a democratic transition through the growth of a liberal 
middle class in the case of contemporary China.  This assessment determined that China 
and China’s middle class does not yet fits Lipset’s model, and that China’s middle class 
displays characteristics that suggest that Lipset’s framework of democratization will not 
hold true in China until the economic basis in China strengthens and the middle class 
grows. 
Since spreading democracy around the world was reasserted as a long-range U.S. 
objective in the early 1990s, attention has focused on prospects for democratization in 
China.  This thesis will help illuminate the political implications of China’s growing 
middle class and argue that China’s economic modernization does not guarantee 
democratization.  This is important because some people in the West misinterpreted the 
origins of the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989 simply as a democracy movement, 
rather then as initially intended to address widely perceived bureaucratic corruption and 
rapidly rising inflation.   Protests subsided in the aftermath of Tiananmen, and many 
Chinese did not react to the CCP’s decision to restore economic stability by entrenching 




B. PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION 
Although Lipset and Huntington have demonstrated that there is a correlation 
between economic development and democratization, both conclude that economic 
development does not lead to rapid democratization.  In the case of China, China does not 
meet Lipset’s requisites for economic development supporting a democracy. China is 
gradually getting closer the requisites outlined by Lipset, but fails to meet them.  
Therefore, China does not have what Huntington defines as the “economic basis” to 
support the trend of democratization seen in Asia during the “third wave” of 
democratization from 1974 to 1989. In addition, Pei has identified a situation in China 
where liberalization has stalled.  In the case of Taiwan, Taiwan meets Lipset’s requisites 
for economic development supporting a democracy. 
Modernization and economic growth, however, has a greater chance of sustaining 
the power of the current regime rather than causing a regime change.  Unless one of 
Huntington’s three economic triggers occurs, the current regime stays in power.  
Therefore, China’s economic growth supports the CCP and not democratization.  
Furthermore, Taiwan’s economic growth does not explain its democratization. 
 China is transitioning to a state that may meet Lipset’s requisites that democratic 
states have.  Despite this socioeconomic development, the prospect of a democratic 
transition is unlikely.159  Taiwan is another Chinese state that has democratized following 
a period of industrialization, modernization and socioeconomic development, and its 
experience shows that meeting requisites alone does not make a state democratic or 
initiate democratization.  Therefore, the middle class initiating liberalization in a state is 
the intervening variable in the relationship between socioeconomic development and 
democratic states.  
The socioeconomic development in China and Taiwan has resulted in a growing 
middle class, the intervening variable in the relationship between socioeconomic 
development and democracy.  Moore explains emergence of Western-style democracy as 
the evolving struggle “to check arbitrary rulers, to replace arbitrary rules with just and  
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rational ones, and to obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of 
rules.”160  Historically, the middle class is essential for regime change to successfully end 
in a Western, liberal democracy.   
The social and economic situation in China and the small and reluctant state of 
China’s middle class suggests that the PRC is not ready for democratization as described 
by Lipset and Huntington.  A weak Chinese middle class, whether it is too small or not 
supporting the opposition to the standing regime, may instead contribute to the formation 
of a fascist or a new communist state, depending on the comparative strength between the 
elites and peasantry.  The economic state of China, its neighbors and the international 
community, and the lack of democratic institutions, would also suggest that 
democratization, such as that seen in Taiwan, would be less likely. 
The KMT and CCP adopted similar policies, but had different approaches with 
Taiwan’s and China’s small business and traditional economies.  While both states 
dominated the control of Taiwan’s and China’s resources and heavy industry, Taiwan 
allowed small businesses to operate more freely then large enterprises.  Farming was also 
allowed to modernize under the KMT while the CCP imposed detrimental economic 
polices on China’s farmers.   
Despite the bureaucratic politics, corruption and inefficiency, Taiwan had access 
to Western markets that were growing faster then communist bloc markets.  But now that 
China has increasing access to growing Western markets, with the help of Taiwanese 
investment, it is conceivable that the same socioeconomic trends that occurred in Taiwan 
will occur in China.  Although the economic policies and growth diverged following the 
Chinese Civil War and start of the Cold War, China’s economy and economic policies 
are likely to intersect those of Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s, when economic reforms 
eventually gave way to political reforms. 
Although the potential of an economically initiated political crisis and revolution 
from above has become more likely in the PRC, several unknowns exist.  These 
unknowns are the level of professionalization in the PLA, the extent of economic 
vulnerability, and the strength of revolution from the working and middle class.  
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Although the PLA’s traditional role and loyalties were shaken in the 1989 Tiananmen 
incident, it has not been challenged with a large scale civil unrest since Tiananmen.  
Although the PRC’s economy and CCP’s rule depends on continued stability and growth 
of the foreign investments the CCP survived the 1997 Asian economic crisis and 
continues to grow in the beginning of the 21st century.  Finally, economic stability and 
limited media access makes assessing the volatility of the working and middle class a 
theoretical exercise without any hard evidence to suggest a firm answer.  
The East Asian developmental states demonstrate the following lessons learned in 
economic modeling.  First, despite the differences among the developmental states, 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan grew economically.  Second, external and internal 
security threats forced elites to protect their interests.  Third, the United States helped to 
shape the security picture in East Asia.  Fourth, the state arranged incentives for 
industrialization and business expansion.  Finally, the role of history and non-economic 
factors provide uncontrollable variables when considering replication of the economic 
model. 
The East Asian developmental states also demonstrate, first, that Lipset’s theory 
on economic growth sustaining a democratic or non-democratic state is valid.  Second, 
real economic growth and planning only comes after an economic problem.  Third, 
resource poor states with national security concerns are more likely to implement a 
successful developmental state strategy. 
In the case of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Przeworski’s assessment of 
modernization empowering both democracies and non-democracies alike is true.  
Particularly for South Korea and Taiwan, the unwavering political support and financial 
aid prior to the Vietnam War resulted in states with little democracy and little need for 
successful economic planning.  Following the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, 
U.S. political and financial involvement in Asia diminished, and Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan were forced to reconsider their economic planning.  Taiwan and South Korea had 
to maintain legitimacy and enhance economic growth in a time when the U.S. was the 
least likely to support them.  Finally, the lack of natural resources, and the end of the  
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imperialist era, forced Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to create more powerful export 
industry, and to utilize the large, educated work force and favorable ties with the West. 
Although a homogeneous population and a Confucian belief system are 
mentioned as factors, these are irrelevant unless categorized.  East Asia’s advantage in 
homogeneous population and Confucianism is relevant due to the era.  Without the tribal 
issues of Africa, religious tensions of the Middle East, and a new peace between China 
and the United States, East Asia was the most stable and peaceful area in the world that 
could provide cheap exports at a competitive price.  In the U.S. Global War on Terrorism, 
this remains the case. 
Therefore, the U.S. needs to do the following concerning the lessons learned from 
the developmental East Asian states.  First, government intervention to establish stability 
and security over the economy is good.  Government intervention aimed at maintaining 
or expanding corruption is bad.  Second, international intervention to convert 
developmental economies and states into permanent western economies and states is 
good.  International intervention aimed at saving the West’s financial interests at the 
expense of the East has proven to be ineffective in solving the inherent weaknesses in the 
developmental economies.   
China’s prospects of following the same path of economic growth as Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan are increased if the lessons are followed, and the historical, economic 
and non-economic events are as closely reproduced.  This requires the continued 
perception of an internal and external threat to the CCP, the active involvement of the 
United States and other international players, and the CCP’s intervention in the 
development of China’s economy.  Just as the Cold War in Asia was filled with 
contradictions, the post-Cold War era will be dominated with contradictions and 
compromises essential to the continued development of China’s political economy.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The United States has a variety of policy options to pursue with its security, 
economic and political interests.  Washington can seek to police security on Asia as the 
region’s hegemonic power, prevent any power from establishing its hegemony over Asia, 
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maintain and expand bilateral alliances in the region, end existing treaty relationships and 
pursue a more flexible balance of power approach to the region, or replace bilateral 
security treaties with a region-wide multilateral security structure like NATO. 
Washington can press free trade in Asia through the WTO, trusting in the long-
term benefits of comparative advantage of the U.S. economy, press fair trade with respect 
to Asia, shielding American labor from the loss of jobs because of low Asian labor costs 
and pressing for improved worker conditions and environmental progress in Asian 
countries, or use Economic incentives and sanction to bring pressures to bear on Asian 
states over security concerns and political issues like human rights. 
Finally, Washington can press human rights and democratization as its foremost 
priority in the region, using economic and other levers to pressure Asian governments, 
employ quiet diplomacy and rely on NGO and private activism to bring about progress on 
these issues while subordinate these issues to security and economic interests, or ignore 
theses issues in official relations with Asian states in order to avoid pressure s that are 
destabilizing and harm security and economic concerns that promise political 
liberalization over the long term. 
The broad objectives of the U.S. policy in Asia include the need to help establish 
and support liberal, democratic states that will help support the United States in the 
Global War on Terror and balance China.  Second, ensure containment of North Korea, 
politically and militarily.  Third, expand cooperation with traditional allies, Japan, South 
Korea, and Singapore.  Fourth, expand cooperation with neutral states within ASEAN 
and Central Asia, and to establish a relationship that can evolve into an alliance in the 
next 20 years.  Finally, support continued globalization and modernization in the People’s 
Republic of China in order bring an end of the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian 
regime. 
Therefore, the United States should set aside the unilateralist policies established 
for winning the Global War on Terror.  Since there is no prospect of either China 
declining in power, there is no way for the United States to act as a hegemon in Asia 
when states can balance U.S. power by strengthening ties with China.  The United States 
should position itself as the better alternative to aligning with a growing and uncertain 
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China.  It should expand on current multilateral and bilateral agreements.  It should help 
developing Asian states to develop free market economies which will encourage 
liberalization, and increase the likelihood of a peaceful, democratic transition.  It should 
employ the same principles of the ASEAN Way and prioritorize strengthening trust and 
cooperation with Asia. 
The United States should alter its National Security Strategy.  First, the NSS 
should state U.S. preference in partnerships with democratic states.  Second, the NSS 
should state U.S. support for democratic states.  Finally, the NSS should state U.S. 
recognition that the transition to democracy, not independence, is an important step that 
the citizens must solely initiate and follow from start to finish without foreign 
interference. 
This change is position is beneficial to the United States.  First, it encourages 
states to transition to democracy on their own accord.  Second, it encourages non-
democratic states to associate with the United States while not aligning with it.  Finally, it 
does not discourage non-democratic states from associating with the United States and 
balance against it.  In the post-Cold War era and Global War on Terror, this policy option 
strengthens the U.S. position, particularly in where U.S. and Chinese interests meet.   
Washington engaged in China’s domestic agenda, following Tiananmen, for three 
reasons.  First, the Cold War ended and there was no reason for Washington to protect the 
CCP as a Cold War ally.  Second, the media coverage over the Tiananmen ‘massacre’ 
compelled politicians in Washington to address Beijing’s appearance of violating the 
human rights of the Tiananmen protesters.  Finally, Washington was forced to readdress 
its association with states that were not democratic and violated human rights. 
Although the CCP and PLA have changed to effectively handle another 
Tiananmen, the next Tiananmen may be larger then 1989.  Economic reforms, 
globalization, and socio-economic development have created new domestic pressures in 
China.  By Lipset’s requisites, China is not ready for democratization, and the CCP and 
PLA are incapable of handling another Tiananmen in today’s standards and scale. 
This is why the United States should not intervene in Chinese domestic affairs.  
First, intervention could initiate a regime change in China that the Chinese may not be 
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ready for, and therefore fail to successfully transition to a democracy.  Second, the risk of 
a Chinese backlash toward the U.S. because of its direct or indirect involvement in a PRC 
regime change could harm relations between Washington, Beijing and Asia.  Finally, a 
new Chinese regime may prove to be more harmful to U.S. interests then the CCP. 
Therefore, Washington should press on with globalization and relying on 
improving socio-economic development to push China to a similar set of requisites that 
led to Taiwanese democratic initiation.  Washington should not directly or indirectly 
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